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Emergency
Responder
What Have We Learned from Past Disasters?  Health
As 
the Deepwater Horizon disaster unfolds 
in the Gulf of Mexico,   public health 
practitioners are having a sinking déjà vu feeling. 
Once again, environmental disaster has struck, and 
tens of thousands of emergency responders—some 
professionals, but many more volunteers—have 
swung into action, potentially risking their health 
as they work to clean up the worst oil spill in U.S. 
history. Veterans of similar disasters are wondering 
if historical lessons learned can help keep the  
damage to a bare minimum. But a paucity of  
hard data on emergency responder health makes it  
difficult even to ask the right questions.
“Emergency responders have not been 
adequately studied,” says Gina Solomon, 
co  director of the occupational and environmental 
medicine residency and fellowship program at 
the University of California, San Francisco, and 
a senior scientist with the Natural Resources 
Defense Council. “They tend to be ignored.”
Will the Deepwater Horizon emergency response workers avoid the health 
fallout experienced by workers in past disasters? OPPOSITE: A cleanup 
worker vacuums surface oil in Barataria Bay, Louisiana, 20 June 2010; 
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Professional emergency respond­
ers such as firefighters may not put 
much emphasis on health effects 
studies. “They are going to do what 
they need to do regardless of their 
own safety,” says Don Donahue, 
executive director of the Center for 
Health Policy & Preparedness at 
the Potomac Institute for Policy 
Studies, who has firefighters in his 
extended family. “They have to be a 
little crazy by definition.” 
That heroic approach is manna 
for the people they save, but fire­
fighters may pay a price with dis­
orders such as cancer. Studies of 
cancers in firefighters have had 
mixed results, but there is evidence 
linking this occupation with brain, 
thyroid, esophageal, bladder, testic­
ular, prostate, and cervical cancers, 
as well as melanoma and Hodgkin 
disease (Bates
1 and Ma et al.
2 are 
two such studies).
Health risks tend to be even 
greater for the many nonprofes  sional 
emergency responders who rush to 
the scene of crises such as oil spills, 
terrorist attacks, hurricanes, train 
derailments, and chemical releases. 
Those workers often don’t have the 
training and advanced equipment 
that protect profes  sional emergency 
responders to some degree. These and many 
other factors make it a daunting challenge to 
protect the health of emergency responders 
during disasters.
Helping Others, Hurting 
Themselves
Two days after the 11 September 2001 col­
lapse of the World Trade Center (WTC) 
in New York City, the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) said in a press 
release that “[m]onitoring and sampling 
conducted on Tuesday and Wednesday have 
been very reassuring about potential expo­
sure of rescue crews and the public to envi­
ronmental contaminants. . . . The EPA and 
OSHA [the U.S Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration] will work closely 
with rescue and cleanup crews to minimize 
their potential exposure.”
3 
In hindsight we understand those were 
hollow assurances, and ongoing research is 
showing that problems sustained by WTC 
responders aren’t diminishing much in num­
ber or severity. Of the estimated 60,000 to 
70,000 emergency responders,4 at least 6,500 
suffered significant new or worsened respira­
tory symptoms,5 and after seven years, many 
workers still experienced abnormal lung 
function.6 More than 1,700 also suffered 
serious probable mental health issues, with 
some still affected up to five years later.7 Still 
others showed diminished chemosensory 
perception after three and a half years—a 
serious concern for these workers given that 
the ability to detect particular odors is a criti­
cal safety concern for emergency responders.8 
About 10,000 of the responders—some 
of whom are simply anticipating possible 
future health problems—are included in the 
pending settlement of financial claims that 
totaled about $713 million as of 10 June 
2010.
9 The money could finally begin flow­
ing by October, nine years after the disaster.
Oil spills also are a source of adverse 
health effects in emergency responders, 
although only 7 of the world’s 38 supertank­
er accidents have been studied for human 
health effects, according to a 2010 review 
by Francisco Aguilera et al.
10 After the 2002 
Prestige supertanker accident that damaged 
the northern coast of Spain and nearby areas 
of France, the longer people worked on the 
cleanup, the more health problems they had. 
Volunteers who were not briefed on the use 
of personal protective equipment were less 
likely to use such equipment and also had 
significantly more nausea, vomiting, diz­
ziness, headaches, and throat and respira­
tory problems. Some disorders lasted more 
than 20 months. Workers also exhibited 
decreases in prolactin and cortisol plasma 
concentrations and elevated levels of 
metals in their blood. Nearly one­
fifth of those who cleaned birds suf­
fered injuries, and many workers in 
a variety of settings had significant 
DNA damage. But even among 
those who used personal protective 
equipment such as masks and special 
clothing, these measures were some­
times less beneficial than expected. 
There is very little publicly avail­
able science on physical health effects 
among cleanup workers following 
the Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989. 
However, on 1 July 2010 the U.S. 
House Committee on Energy and 
Commerce requested such informa­
tion held by ExxonMobil, and the 
company is cooperating with the 
request, says committee spokeswom­
an Karen Lightfoot. Once the com­
mittee has reviewed the information, 
it hopes to share it with others in the 
near future, she says. 
Since  the  explosion  of  BP’s 
Deepwater  Horizon  oil  rig  on 
20 April 2010, a range of acute 
health problems have been report­
ed as more than 40,100 emergency 
responders work to clean up the 
spilled oil. Toxics of concern include 
the oil itself (including a pervasive oil 
mist) and its constituents benzene, 
toluene, ethylbenzene, and xylene; gases and 
particulate matter from intentional oil burn­
ing; and the mixture of crude oil and disper­
sants used to help break down the oil in the 
water. The nearly unprecedented scale of the 
pollution and the lengthy periods of time 
responders are working have many people 
concerned about short­ and long­term health 
effects in both responders and the general 
public.
11–13 For acute problems alone, 967 
workers had reported injuries or illnesses 
as of June 20—the latest figures from the 
National Institute for Occupational Safety 
and Health (NIOSH).
14 Only seven cases 
have been attributed to exposures to oil or 
other chemicals, but it’s impossible to say 
how many of the accidents treated and inci­
dences of dizziness, nausea, and fainting 
may have resulted from a reaction to toxic 
exposures, and neither NIOSH nor other 
independent medical personnel have verified 
incident data reported by BP.
14 
Relatively small disasters also are a source 
of risk for emergency responders. When 
a 1991 train derailment near Dunsmuir, 
California, plunged a tanker car into the 
Sacramento River, about 19,000 gallons of 
metam sodium spewed into the water. The 
reaction between the pesticide and the water 
quickly formed noxious substances includ­
























A volunteer cleans a beach after the Exxon Valdez spill, Prince William 
Sound, 13 April 1989. The Exxon Valdez spill presented many of the 
same worker health challenges as the Deepwater Horizon disaster but 
yielded little in the way of publicly available health data.and carbon disulfide. Among the emergency 
responders were local prisoners who spent 
considerable time in the water removing 
dead fish; about two­thirds suffered derma­
titis on their feet and ankles. Other state 
and federal employees doing similar work 
had no dermatitis. Later analysis revealed 
that most of the unharmed people quickly 




Several studies have concluded that 11–16% 
of the general population is substantially 
more vulnerable to toxic exposures than the 
remaining population.16–19 Percentages of 
first responders harmed in the emergencies 
already mentioned tended to fall in or near 
this range; at least 10% of WTC emergency 
responders got sick, as did 19% of the people 
who cleaned oiled birds after the Prestige acci­
dent and 7% of the residents (including many 
emergency responders) after the 1993 MV 
Braer supertanker accident off the Shetland 
Islands.10 In some cases, the percentages were 
far higher—53% for area residents, including 
cleanup workers, following the 1999 Erika 
supertanker accident near Brittany, France,10 
and 64% for the Dunsmuir prisoners.15
The rough correlation of these num­
bers isn’t a coincidence. “I am sure that first 
responders’ susceptibility to toxic exposures is 
on the same continuum as the general popu­
lation’s,” says Lynn Goldman, a professor of 
environmental health sciences at the Johns 
Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, 
who has studied the Dunsmuir incident. 
However, she cautions that the specific type 
of vulnerability varies from person to person 
and is unpredictable, and that professional 
responders, moreover, may be a little less vul­
nerable due to the “healthy worker” effect.20
Michael Crane, an assistant professor 
of preventive medicine at the Mount Sinai 
School of Medicine, agrees it’s impossible 
to predict who may get sick while working 
during an emergency. He says the science 
remains too poorly developed to use genetic 
information, biomarkers, or family history 
as predictive tools.
Nevertheless, there are still several 
options  for  gauging  when  emergency 
responders need to take added precautions. 
One is simply to rely on human senses. 
However, many toxics are difficult to smell 
at airborne concentrations that can harm 
health. Moreover, stopping—even briefly—
to assess how a situation smells runs counter 
to the traditional responder mentality of 
instantly doing what he or she needs to do.
Another option is to quickly check post­
disaster health symptoms in the general pop­
ulation—if the general population is being 
affected, even though folks are farther from 
the source of the exposure and aren’t labor­
ing hard in proximity to the toxicants, that’s 
a warning signal for the workers. In the case 
of the Deepwater Horizon disaster, residents 
as far as 50 miles inland have complained 
about strong odors, says Marylee Orr, execu­
tive director of the Louisiana Environmental 
Action Network. Others have had to double 
their asthma medication, she says, and some 
have been barely able to breathe. However, 
at a June 22–23 Institute of Medicine work­
shop on health effects of the spill, Mary 
Currier, Mississippi’s state health officer, 
reported that “so far none of the surveillance 
data indicate increases in human illness 
that could relate back to oil or dispersant 
exposure.”
21 
Relying on either of these approaches 
would be consistent with the precaution­
ary principle, which holds that it’s wise to 
assume a substance is dangerous until it’s 
proven safe. Linda Rae Murray, president­
elect  of  the  American  Public  Health 
Association and chief medical officer of 
the Cook County (Illinois) Department of 
Public Health, supports the precautionary 
principle. But she acknowledges that both 
having a quick emergency response and pro­
tecting the responders is very difficult.
In order to better quantify such deci­
sions, the dominant current practice among 
public health officials is to compare sampled 
toxic emissions in a disaster area with avail­
able health benchmarks. Based on monitor­
ing data for a dozen or so pollutants taken at 
a small number of airborne and land­based 
fixed and mobile monitors, the EPA consis­
tently said during the first seven weeks of 
the Deepwater Horizon disaster there was no 
serious health threat, although the agency 
acknowledged there could be a pronounced 
smell similar to that of a gas station and that 
short­term problems such as headaches and 
nausea were possible.
22
Relying on available health standards 
and limited monitoring concerns Murray: 
“Situations like that in the Gulf bring into 
clear focus a problem we usually ignore,” 
which is that OSHA standards are “hor­
ribly outdated,” and no standards accurately 
account for factors such as real­world expo­
sure to multiple toxics. She also says there 
are no standards that address the exposures 
and stress endured during extra­long cri­
sis workdays that can go on for weeks or 
months; “all our metrics go out the win­
dow,” she says. Her concerns about stress are 
supported by a growing body of science that 
shows psychological stress in conjunction 
with toxic exposures can increase adverse 
health effects.
23–26 Crane also notes that 
the limited monitors don’t document expo­
sures in the microenvironments of thou­
sands of individual workers, and land­based 
monitoring doesn’t capture elevated levels 
that may exist offshore nearer the fresh oil.
Joseph Hughes, program director of the 
Worker Education and Training Program 
at the National Institute of Environmental 
Health Sciences (NIEHS), agrees there are 
serious problems with current standards for 
these kinds of situations. “There’s tremen­
dous uncertainty in using these [pollution 
monitor] readings and being able to have 
some kind of accurate risk framework,” he 
says. He notes that the EPA has been work­
ing on this issue with its collaborative Acute 
Exposure Guideline Levels program, which 
has been operating since 1986, but much 
remains to be done before there can be a 
comprehensive set of standards that address 
these limitations.
A High-Stakes Juggling Act
Even  when  emergency  responders  use 
the  best  available  protection,  many 
problems  can  still  arise.  For  instance, 
Murray says, “Wearing a respirator is not 
benign”—longer­term use can tax the lungs, 
and a respirator, especially combined with a 
protective suit, can contribute to substantial 
heat stress. The Deepwater Horizon Unified 
Area Command—which includes BP and 
the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), in consulta­
tion with OSHA—weighed the risks and 
benefits of using respirators during the first 
seven weeks of the Deepwater Horizon clean­
up. BP spokesman Mark Proegler says that 
since no air standards were being violated, 
the company chose not to issue respirators to 
workers (under OSHA’s voluntary respirator 
requirements) and to reassign any workers 
who insisted on wearing a respirator. After 
consultation with NIOSH, BP has agreed to 
provide respirators to personnel involved in 
the in situ burning of oil, Proegler says.
According to Proegler, all such decisions 
are made mutually through the Unified Area 
Command, but many critics have questioned 
who is in charge of worker protection—or 
who should be in charge. However, in this 
emergency and others, laws that are based 
on factors such as the geographic location of 
the accident and the material involved dic­
tate who is responsible for what, precluding 
some options. 
Proegler says the Safety Unit of the 
Unified Area Command includes safety 
and industrial hygiene personnel from the 
USCG, BP, and OSHA. In the Deepwater 
Horizon response, although OSHA does not 
have jurisdiction offshore, the Unified Area 
Command has a written memorandum of 
understanding that defines a consultative 
role for OSHA. In addition, he says, the 
USCG and OSHA each have safety and 
industrial hygiene personnel at the Mobile 
and Houma command centers.
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and private parties, Crane says, “There has 
to be a complementary role for both. It’s an 
important and necessary partnership, but 
it’s not always a happy marriage.” To dimin­
ish the impacts of any disagreements on 
emergency responders, he says it’s essential 
they hear the same guidance for protective 
practices from both the public and private 
parties because such mutual reinforcement 
is more likely to sink in.
Eight  U.S.  House  committees 
worked in June and July on legislation 
that could change many aspects of emer­
gency responses, potentially including 
super  vision, protection, surveillance and 
research of health problems, and medical 
treatment. For instance, the proposed Oil 
Spill Accountability and Environmental 
Protection Act of 2010 that was being dis­
cussed in the House in July includes provi­
sions requiring that the party responsible for 
an incident pay for personal injuries suffered 
due to that incident, says Lisette Morton, 
legislative director for Rep. Jerrold Nadler 
(D–NY). That would modify the Oil 
Pollution Act of 1990, which doesn’t stipu­
late such payments. However, Morton says 
it probably won’t be until at least September 
that the House and Senate may agree on a 
bill with these and other provisions. 
Nadler says one overarching document 
that doesn’t need much revision at this time 
is the National Response Framework, a 
guide administered by the Department of 
Homeland Security that spells out how all 
parties should prepare for and respond to 
disasters. “[The framework is] good if it’s 
adhered to,” he says, but that didn’t hap­
pen for the Deepwater Horizon crisis, he 
adds. “Generally speaking, the government 
has significant authority it just didn’t fully 
utilize or adequately carry out,” he explains. 
“We’re not talking about a major overhaul, 
but rather fine­tuning and direction.”
The basic guidance in OSHA’s Hazard­
ous Waste Operations and Emergency 
Response Standard (HAZWOPER),
27 a 
primary guide for emergency responders, 
also helps create adequate protection if it’s 
followed, Hughes says. For instance, he 
notes that HAZWOPER generally adopts a 
precautionary approach, suggesting greater 
initial protection for workers and down­
grading that only if incoming data confirm 
that lesser protection is warranted. “And 
that’s the approach we have consistently 
encouraged BP to take,” he says. 
To better implement in the field what is 
on paper, Crane says it’s best to first inform 
volunteers they may be vulnerable to health 
effects from emergency response if they 
have existing health problems, then let them 
decide whether to work. However, economic 
considerations often mean workers feel they 
can’t afford to refuse hazardous work.
Once workers are in the field, Crane 
says it’s essential to follow the basics: educate 
them, train them for their specific task(s), 
identify the natural leaders, work within the 
culture of the group, explain and enforce 
job rules, closely monitor all workers, and 
make sure personal protective equipment is 
replaced or repaired if it becomes damaged.
When considering iffy situations such 
as the use of respirators in hot settings, 
Murray says one remedy is to use air­
conditioned protective suits, although she 
acknowledges these are expensive and in 
short supply. Another option is to provide 
standard respirators and make sure workers 
take frequent breaks and are paid for their 
break times. She adds that supervisors and 
monitors need to be independent experts 
who aren’t obligated to please a company 
trying to save money.
Up Next for the Deepwater 
Horizon Workers
Looking ahead for the Deepwater Horizon 
crisis, 40,119 emergency responders have 
voluntarily provided basic contact and 
Deepwater Horizon job description informa­
tion to NIOSH as of July 16, allowing them 
to possibly be involved in postevent research 
efforts (although key baseline health data 
prior to exposure won’t be available), says 
NIOSH spokesman Fred Blosser. Some of 
that research is taking shape under the aus­
pices of the NIEHS. The goal of the Gulf 
Long­Term Follow­Up (GuLF) Study is to 
evaluate more than 20,000 of the cleanup 
workers for a range of possible health effects, 
including  respiratory,  neuro  behavioral, 
carcinogenic, immunologic, and mental 
health disorders, says Dale Sandler, chief of 
the Epidemiology Branch in the NIEHS 
Division of Intramural Research. Some of 
the study subjects would be workers who 
have enrolled in training but not yet been 
exposed, serving as a comparison group. The 
initial five years of the planned study would 
cost about $28 million, $8 million of which 
has already been allocated by the National 
Institutes of Health (BP officials did not 
respond to repeated inquiries about whether 
they would pay for this research or for any 
treatment that is needed). Sandler says up to 
20 years of research is desirable in order to 
evaluate the potential for long­term effects 
such as cancer. 
The research might begin as soon as 
September after the team, aided by NIEHS 
contractor SRA International, works with 
the agencies, organizations, and com­
munities involved to finish designing the 
program, Sandler says. She explains that 
the study will not provide medical care or 
testing for participants, but participants 
will be able to inform their doctor about the 
overall study results—which are expected 
to be released as soon as various phases 
become available—and the doctor can pro­
ceed accordingly. 
What health lessons will the Deepwater 
Horizon disaster yield for future emergency 
response workers—and will we heed them? 
Only time will tell. For today Crane hopes 
any lessons learned can help break the pat­
tern seen in past disasters of unnecessary 
destruction and loss of life followed by 
lengthy periods of poorly controlled toxic 
exposures for emergency responders.
Bob Weinhold, MA, has covered environmental health issues 
for numerous outlets since 1996. He is a member of the Society 
of Environmental Journalists.
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